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Introduction
The fu ture of the welfare state concerns so many people and their
well-being that it has to be considered seriously. Research on the
welfare state has been a neglected area of study and it is only during
the last decade that sociologists, political scientists. historians.
philosophers and economists have turned their attention in that
direction. The attention is clearly related to the 'crisis' of the welfare
state - whether the phenomenon is seen as a crisis of, a crisis in. or
a crisis by the welfare state; or a crisis located in capitalism - i.e.
construction of the state or the national/international economy spilling
over into the welfare state. The crisis phenomenon has so dominated
our way of thinking that much of the basic thinking as to wby the
welfare state was constructed in the first place, is getting lost. The call
for immediate solu tions by politicians and influential groups over-
shadow the long-term functions of the welfare state and this ahillorical
and limited perspective is now a much greater threat to the welfare
state than pending financial problems and unsupportable unemploy-
ment rates.
This diversion from the ideological rationale for the welfare state
makes it all the more important to concentrate on its future. But for
this kind of research there is neither a coherent analytical framework
nor an adequate methodology. InstrUments for short-term planning and
predictions have been developed, but the more the time horizon is
2 Comparing Welfare States and tbeir Futures
expanded the more unreliable such instruments become. But it is still
possible to go beyond educated guesses.
One way of doing so is to extrapolate historical and recent trends
and evaluate under which conditions these trends will continue.
Another way is to identify the processes underlying the welfare state
and ask whether they are so inherent in our culture that they will
persist in the future. Still another way of approaching the problem is to
ask how universal these processes are. given different models of the
welfare state.
In this book we are using all three approaches. We accept that there
is no one unifying model which allows us to compare welfare states
across national boundaries (Heidenheimer et al.. 1975). We also
acknowledge that different welfare systems are designed and imple-
mented on a national scale. thereby almost defying comparison and the
concept of the welfare state. But in our search for unifying frames of
analysis we have been Sttu ck again and again by the fact that it seems
to ~ tbe same underlying processes 'Wbicb guide tbe future of tbe
'Welfare states. regardless of their cultural context or their stage of
development. Therefore. it is to these processes we address ourselves.
trying to identify them in the historical development of different
welfare states and in the mounting pressures which are now surrounding
many welfare states. For this purpose we have selected countries with
very dissimilar developments and nestled in very different cultures.
using various theoretical approaches and empirical documentation.
We are aware of the fact that the concept of the welfare state is a
poor analytical concept. But since it is crucial to the ongoing debate we
still chote to usc it. The core idea of the welfare state is that of a state
providing for citizens who are not able to cover basic needs. Basic needs
are defined within a cultural context and vary from a daily ration of
rice to universal economic security measured in relation to a national
income. The SCt of welfare institutions constructed to meet basic needs
is one of leVeral operational definitions of a welfare state. The role of
the state can ~ either that of organising. guaranteeing or acknow-
ledging these: institutions. As the concept of basic needs expands. the
welfare institutions grow more comprehensive and diversified. and the
role of the welfare state merges with the role of the state.
The selection of countries presented represents the embryonic
welfare state, the pending welfare state and the well developed welfare
state, each with their specific sets of welfare institutions.
How ralls the criIiI?
Much of the research 10 far has taken for granted that the crisis of the
welfare state is real, but this raises several questions. First. it is im-
portant to distinguish ~tween crisis symptoms and systemic crisis.
Second. it is necCSlllry to analyse the relationship between social change
Jde"tifyi"g tbe FlltlIre of tbe Welflln State 3
and crisis. And third, it is important to ask why we, at this stage in
rime, are confronted with a crisis definition and what the underlying
forces of such a definition are. Only when approaching these questions
can we gain insight into whether the fu ture of the welfare state is at
stake. whether it needs to be dismantled to meet the crisis or whether
it needs strengthening, protection or change in order to meet chal-
lenges ahead.
Society is composed of a number of systems and sub-systems which
are interwoven and dependent upon each other. Changes in one of the
systems are likely to bring about changes in other systems. and society
is constantly adapting to these changes. Some of the systems are stable,
while others undergo fundamental changes which make them lose their
original content and functions. A crisis can be seen in this perspective.
If one of the systems is threatened by changes that makes it lose its
original content and functions, then this system is in crisis. Other
systems in society can be threatened by this crisis to such an extent
that they also become crisis prone. And if enough of the systems enter
into a crisis, society itself will be thrown into a crisis.
Historically we can see that social change, and even rapid social
change, has been a feature of all industrialised countries, and is in-
creasingly becoming so in the developing countries. Some of this
change is being absorbed in established systems, while other systems
have been transformed into systems with entirely new characteristics;
or have been irretrievably lost. Looking back, we can say that the latter
systems were in crisis. Looking forward. we can say that social change
has become inherent in all modem societies, but it is difficult to know
when penetrating social change becomes a crisis and how this crisis
spreads to other systems. One approach. which has been utterly mis-
used because it has not been rooted in coherent theories about social
change, is to look for crisis indicators.
In discussing social change we are not only facing methodological
and theoretical considerations. We are also facing normative issues. An
evaluation of the value of social change will always raise the question
as to whether the change is 'better' or 'worse' than maintaining the
status quo. or provoking a crisis. We shall try to leave the moral
question aside here, but let the problem be mentioned.
The present crisis has been defined largely as an economic crisia, or
by some, as a crisis of the management of the economy. Much of the
responsibility for the crisis is being placed within the welfare ltate
which is demanding still larger shares of the national economy. While
there is little doubt that social expenditure constitu tes a growing part
of the national budgets (d. Chapters 7, 9, 11 and 12). one may
question whether this is an indication of a crisis in the welfare ltate or
of the poverty of the economic models used. Demographers have fore-
cast changes in the composition of the population which would put
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heavy demands on social expenditures (Chapter 7), but the economistS
have not incorporated in their models the micro- and macro-<conomics
of the welfare srate. For example. while unemployment is a central
variable, expenditure for unemployment benefits is a peripheral
variable, as is the economic behaviour of the unemployed. It seems that
social change has come so rapidly that the economists have not bccn
able to cope with it intellectually. An easy. but much too simplistic
explanation is to define the welfare state as being in crisis.
Nevenheless the economists are not aloDe. Mishra (Chapter 2) shows
how sociologists have ignored the analysis of the welfare state and
instead focus on social problems. social policies and institutional
analysis. Although sociologists are trained to analyse the structure and
functioning of society as a whole, they have not developed theories of
the welfare state which caD help us in the present situation. There is no
precise definition of a welfare state, although there is widespread agree-
ment on its functions. Also, it should be borne in mind. that the
welfare state may not even be a useful analytical concept, however
popular it is, because many of the functions of the welfare state cannot
be separated from other political and economic responsibilities of the
national state. The East-European countries, for example. do not use
the concept of the welfare state - admittedly for ideological reasons -
but their range of social provisions for their citizens reaches far beyond
that of countries which regard themselves as true welfare states
(Chapter 10). The Japanese welfare provisions. though well developed,
are not organised in the context of the national srate (sec Chapter 8).
Himmelstrand (Chapter 3) argues that it is not the welfare state as
IUch which is in crisis but the mature capitalistic society and the way
we have arranged vital functions around the capitalistic way of life.
which are in jeopardy. He points to the growing number of 'external
effects' of capitalist production which the welfare state slowly and
reluctantly is being forced to take over. One of the basic functions
of the welfare state was to shield marginal individuals from the impact
of the marker forces. But the welfare state now encompasses the
majority of the population and through its emphasis on quality of life
and social rights acts both as a buffer betwccn capitalistic interests and
a vehicle of these interests, thereby creating internal contradictions
which society has no model for coping with.
Rupainghe (Chapter 15) shows in his analysis of Sri Lanka how the
introduction of an international capitalistic culture not only break.
down an established and modest welfare state based on benefits in
kind, but actually demands that the majority of benefits be abolished
in order for the new society to take over. This introduction of crisis
in the welfare system sccm. to have severe repercussion. for other parts
of society, especially the political system. thereby creating a political
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instabiliry which might undermine the 'modernising' of the economy
and throw the whole society into crisis.
Piven and Cloward (Chapter 4) give a histori -al account of how the
ideological and structural separation of the economic from the political
system both strengthened capitalist society and delaycd the advan e-
ment of a welfare state in the U A. People participated in ·politics'. but
it was not a politics of property and redistribution, and so ial problems
were excluded as irrelevant to the public economy. Howe,·er. as the US
economy expanded in the twentieth century. so did the 'externalities'
and the business communlty's need for State intervention. The crisis in
the economic system between the two world wars brought about pro-
found changes in the political system and popular demands for state
intervention in favour of unemployment benefits. pensions for the
aged, low-cost housing. legislation regulanng the work sphere. etc ..
challenged the laissez-faire ideology.
Here, as in many other countries, the crisis In the economic system
actually acted as 'midwife' to the welfare state. The Reagan admini-
stration has been trying to restorc the ideology of less state interv,·ntion
in order to save the economy from what is defined as a crisis. Rut US
social programmes now constitute a large and intricate apparatus of
governmental and quasi-governmental organisations that arc inter-
woven in the political system. Therefote. they are more difficult to
dismantle and less ctisis prone than before.
Heinze, Hinrichs and Olk (Chapter 5) locatc the crisis in thc admini-
strative organisation of the welfare state which was ctcated for othcr
purposes and now is incapable of handling the complex problems which
face it. The example they use is the fragmented organisational system
for controlling unemployment in West Germany which used to be an
administration of unemployment benefits. The many actors involvcd
respond rationally within their own sub-system, but the sum of their
decision-making crcates an irrational rcsponse which defeats efficient
action. They argue that the continuation of the welfare state in its
present form depends on a sufficient demand for labour since individual
income is distributed through participation in thc labour market. Whilc
Piven and Cloward (Chapter 4) stress thc fact that it is in the interest of
capitalism to keep unemployment rates high, Heinze, Hinrichs and Olk
stress the fact that structural barriers undermine the consensus and
innovation which the political administrative system needs in order to
solve the transnational problem of threatening unemployment ra tes.
What we are witnessing are societies in rapid change, which are
subject to forces we know much too little about, whether it be the
impact of new technology, complex decision-making processes,
demands for extendcd democratic rights, demographic changes, un-
familiar political and economic constellations or new channels for
information, etc. The welfare state is affected by these forces, as is the
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rest of society. But why is it that the welfare state becomes the main
object of a crisis definition and a prime target for criticism?
One answer could be thilt the modem welfare state now involves
such a large number of citizens that the concern is more widespread.
However, these people :l1so have a stake in defending their rights under
the welfare state. Opinion polls made in several western countries show
that the majority of the population is against changes that will impede
these rights. Still the welfare sute is under attack. It is accused of
crellting a crisis. through high social expenditures which undermine and
twist the national economy (whether in Sri Lanka or the USA). through
the level of unemployment benefits which is seen to contribute to un-
employment and distonion of the labour market, and through its
ideology which is considered contradictory to important social goals.
The welfare state is also accused of being in crisis because of lack of
financing. rigid organisation, poor delivery of services. unsolved
problems. and never ending needs for e"pansion.
All these arguments arc no doubt valid, but the sum of the argument
docs not necessarily reveal a welfare state in crisis.
Historically. none of the arguments arc new - only the vocabulary
and the sophistication of the statements have changed. This. of course,
is closely related to the very nature of the welfare state, the initial
struggle for its development and the challenges which emerging and
more developed welfare states still face - and will still f&ce in the
future.
Much of the recent literature on social policy wd the welfare scate
h.., defined the functions (both intended &nd unintended) of specific
social programmes and the welfare scate as a macro-social phenomenon.
Molt of the authors sec the welfare state as a way of bridging conflicts
of interest, between classes, different distributional systems. market
forces and human needs. majority and marginal groups. and between
interests of specific kinds. More senerally, the welfare state is seen as
scttins the limits to the dqrcc: of social distance which a society can
accept without conflict emerging. At the same time the welfare state
serves u a frame for bridging all these conflicts and a legitimation of
the political and economic arr&ngements and institutions which
represent these interests (Dahrendorf 1958; Ticmuss 1958: Rex 1961:
Piven and Cloward 1971: Oyen 1974: Korpi 1978: Flora and
Heidenheimer 1981:Mishra 1981).
However, the welfare state is far from being a perfect vehicle for
bridJing the kinds of conflict which seem to be part of all societies.
Welfare States vary in the d~e to which they have confined the con-
flicts in institu tional forms, and to the degree the redistributional
mcuul'Cl have been &ccepted by the parties involved. But within them
all arc onloing battles u to how far redistribution should go, how far
social rights ahould be extended. what kind of new beneficiaries should
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be IOcluded, how much state intervention should be allowed. and who
should gi\·e up privileges in order ro extend the "'eliare Hate. Some of
the battles have been vIolent; orne ha\'e been forced to the surface b~'
the underprivileged themselves. while others have been taken LIp \)\'
intellectuals and the middle class and rurned into unlversalistic pro-
grammes.
The interests of capital. represented by the bUSiness Cl1mmunily. the
industrialists and the conservative forces. have ahva~'s seen the wdfare
state as a threat to their interests. and Wilh good rea-on since the
welfare state sprung out of an effort to curb these same interests.
Through compromises and indirect means of control they have
influenced the shape of the welfare state and IOcorporated their
interests in such a way that the welfare state provides pan of the infra-
structure of capitalism, and capitalistic ideology has beeorne part "I th,'
welfare state (Chapter 3).
During the 1960s and earl)' 19705 radicals in rno t 01 the Westcrn
welfare states attacked their governments for nol having gone far
enough in solving social problems. abandoning class diffl'fcnccs, in-
corporating minorities and creating a more jusl basis for incomc
distribution and social wages. In lhe forefront were social cienti t
who exposed poveny, inequalities, lack of opportunitics and the viCIOUS
circle of maldevelopment. The welfare states cenalnly expanded dunng
this period, as the increases in social expendilure, coverage of people.
quantity of social programmes and the number of employee working
for the welfare state reveal. But it is probably fair to add thaI lhis ex-
pansion was more a result of a general expansion in the economy
rather than of the efforts of radicals and social scientists.
When the economy receded the scales tipped and the more con-
servative forces rook over with the crisis definition of the welfare stale.
The radicals withdrew their critiCIsm for fear of an unholy alliance
which would harm the welfare stare. However. rhey had helped la)' lhe
foundation for the conservative critics and their argumenr thar there was
a crisis in the welfare state in that it was not rneetingsucial needs. which
was transformed into a claim that there was a crisis of the welfare srate
and an economic crisis created by the welfare state. The crisis definition
is now being used as an ideological basis for reducing social expen-
diture, changing redistributive patterns in disfavour of lhe marginal
groups and reducing government responsibility in social policy. This
attirude may be seen in relation ro a more general social change from
labour intensive to capital intensive industries which in principle render
rhe pacifying power of the welfare state more insignificant. For some
it becomes profitable to define the crisis as so 'real' that drastic
measures have to be taken in order to halt the expansion of the welfare
state - or better, reverse its development.
Besides these traditional actors on the arena of lhe welfare Slale.
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there are also other actors who have a vested interest in the future of
the welfare SUte and who will throw their strength into keeping the
statuS quo or changing the discourse according to which most serves
their interests. The labour unions, for eumple, have raken very
different roles: in Scandinavia they have aided the development of the
welfare state; in the USA they have taken over welfare rights; and in
Australia they have remained on the side line of the welfare state. Now
labour unions in these countries, as well as in many other countries,
realise that social wages are a very important supplement to ordinary
wages and are worth flJlhting for. The professionals, as well as the
bureaucrats who make a living and a meaningful existence through the
welfare state, have a heavy interest in keeping the status quo. Even the
medical associations which in all countries have fought against in-
corporation in the welfare state services, are now realising that
competition among medical doctors in the industrialised countries is
growing fierce and a closer integration into the welfare state is offering
their group a certain economic protection. Voluntary agencies, ideo-
logical societies, self-help groups and other private organisations try to
sell their services through the welfare state. Hospitals as well as research
units depend on the welfare state for funding and try to bend the
welfare state to suit their purposes. For many groups wage settlements
are no longer a two party agreement between employers and em-
ployees. but a three party negotiation with welfare benefits as a
mediating element.
For analysts of the welfare state the outcomes of all these activities
are difficult to evaluate. We know much too Iitde about the changes of
composition of the groups involved, the nature of their ideologies, the
immanent contradictions of their behaviour, the intensity and impact
of their activities and the channels through which their influence is
directed.
The strengrh of the activity of all these interest groups is hardly
surprising. The welfare SUte is turning into one of the most important
institutions of redistribution, second only to the labour market and the
family and is gaining on both these institutions. In some countries
social expenditure constitutes up to a third of all public expenditure,
one fifth of the population get their entire economic support in
benefits in cash, while many more receive benefits in kind through
institutional care, health services, etc. The rewards of managing to
define a group as 'needy' under a well developed welfare state can be
profitable for its members, especially if individual taxes are high and
progressive. Much can also be gained if competing groups can be
squeezed out of the welfare market or their rights be questioned.
When this happens in a poorly developed welfare state, the loss of a
group being excluded in this way can be a matter of life or death (see
Chapter 1.5).
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The welfare state has become an instrument of power. through the
number of citizens it affects, the size of its economy and the interests
vested in it. and as such. it has also become p&rt of a power game. A
crisis definition. for example, can be seen as part of this power game -
as can calls to support the present welfare state. The rules by which to
play the game are partly institutionalised. but much of the scene is left
for innovative and unorthodox behaviour from pressure group activities
outside accepted channels. the labelling of 'enemies' as misusers, and
depicting imagined and undocumented consequences of social security
spending.
The scene is complex. and it is this unruly kaleidoscope of actors,
activities and extemal forces which we are facing when we try to probe
into the future of the welfare state.
The .eudl for new IOludol1l
The welfare state is not built upon an inner logic from which policy
decisions can be deduced. Although some of the more developed
welfare states have a dominant ideology, the implementation does not
reflect a coherent system of social programmes. Since the welfare sute
has grown out of the many conflicting interests. it has also coopted
and integrated them into its system. In the process the welfare state
has become an extremely complex organisation of programmes, legis-
lation and ideologies. the intemal logic of which is at best difficult
to discern. and at worst direcdy counteractive to the idea of a welfare
state. This complexity has become a distinct feature of the welfare
states. It only adds to the complexity discussed earlier in relation to
the many interest groups involved in the welfare scene and the rapid
social changes confronting most countries.
Faced with this complexity and a range of problems for which there
are no precedents, it seems that govemments are turning to the past for
solutions when pushed to make decisions on the welfare state. The
disturbing uncertainty of future challenges are met with the security of
former time, although the old solutions hardly seem to solve the
problems. The very market forces that the welfare state was developed
to curb, are called upon again in order to meet the ·crisis'. State inter-
vention which developed as a guarantee for equal access to welfare
provisions, is to be reduced. private organisations and the family are
again seen as the most adequate units for extending welfare, while self-
help groups are being encouraged. Centralised responsibility for social
programmes is being retumed to the local communities. now under the
label of democratic reforms. and hard-won universalistic measures are
being questioned. Redistributional systems in favour of the less
privileged are slackened. High unemployment rates are now defined IS
tolerable and even necesaary for a healthy national economy, while
unemployment compensations are decreasing.
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Altogether. it looks like these 'solutions' have swept over the world,
regardless of the size and content of the problems they arc intended to
solve.
The intricate question is not only whether these responses are
adequate solutions to perceived and real problems. It is also impotUnt
to ask if the processes underlying these solutions are related to the
welf:lte state as such. and what arc the implications for the futute of
the welfare state in the implementation of such solutions.
In all the countries surveyed in this book the call for these kinds of
solu tions has increased strongly during the last few yean, the only
exception being Japan. The demands fot the solutions have been set
forward independent of the degree of dcvelopment of the welfare
states or the colour of the political parry in power. They have also
been forwarded independent of whether economic difficulties have
penetrated the national economics or only touched upon the fringes,
whether state intervention and bureaucratic tesponsibiliry are extensive
or limited. and whether national unemployment rates are unusually
high or moderate.
This could be an indicator that the problems per se are not the main
target of the solutions. While the complexiry of the welfare sute has no
inner logic. most of the solutions can be seen as firmly rooted in an
adjusted capitalistic laissez-faire ideology aimed at the welfare: state.
Part of the ideology is explicitly linked to rational economic models
(e.g. 'neo-conservatism' in Sri Lanka and USA). Much of the ideology,
however. is also formed through the many small and independent
decisions made in response to an unidentified and incoherent crisis
definition. The welfare state itself offers no answers. so the lack of
alternative forces a choice between two possibilities which in fact
compliment each other. namely the solutions offered in the early days
of the welfare state and those of present-day neo-capitalism. Since it
is also the nco-capitalistic ideology which has produced the present
crisis definirion, it only seems reasonable that the many small decision-
making units should seek their solutions within this frame of reference.
There is little doubt that the sum of solutions offered is detrimental
to the welfare state and. if carried forward with sufficient strength and
intensity may be fatal, or, in our terminology. can throw the welfare
Itate into a real crilis which will strip it of its present content and
functions. These forces set into morion have been called 'recapitali-
zation of capitalism' (Miller 1978), and arc the same antagonistic forces
which had initially to be overcome in order to develop a welfarc sute
(Milhra 1981).
The welfare states respond differently to the pressure to find new
solutions. In general terms it can be said that the more dcveloped the
wclfare statcs arc. the less likely thcy are to yield to new ideas wh ich
arc counteractive to the social programmes developed. But here the
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content and organisation of the welfare state has a decisive influence
(0yen 1980 and 1984). Welfare states with universal benefit pro-
grammes are less subject to change because infringement of social rights
challenges large segments of the population. In his analysis of the
Scandinavian countries johansen (Chapter 9) shows how these
countries have been under attack because of steep increases in social
expenditure and taxes. New political parties have been formed as a
result of this criticism, but no major programmes have been abandoned
and social expenditure has more or less kept on increasing. The vested
interests in maintaining the status quo arc so widespread that much of
the criticism can be seen as symbolic rhetoric.
New Zealand as described by jack (Chapter 11) and Austria as
described by Busch n al. (Chapter 12), are other examples of stable
welfare states based upon universal principles, which arc resisting calls
for basic changes. Welfare states which incorporate vital interest groups
or have developed interest groups within the organisation of the welfare
state, have defenders built into the system who are reluctant to accept
change and who arc in a position to defend their vested interests
(Denhick 1979). The USA, as described by Piven and Cloward
(Chapter 4) and West Germany, as described by Grunow (Chapter 13),
can also be described as relatively stable in this sense.
Welfare states which reflect the work ethic of the country, as well
as other basic norms, are also less prone to the 'new' solutions. The
prime example here is japan where it is institutionally difficult to dis·
tinguish between work and welfare, and the ethic of collectivist welfare
is expressed through the work place rather than a national welfare state
(Chapter 8). The demands for reform along the lines discussed above
have therefore been negligible. While the fragile welfare state of Sri
Lanka stands to be crushed under the weight of new reforms (Chapter
15). The stability of the well-developed Hungarian welfare state is sub-
jected to different political forces. Interest groups and neo·conservative
solutions are apparent but in principle are more effectively controlled
(Chapter 10).
None the less changes are occurring in every welfare state and these
changes now seem to be moving in the same direction. If allowed to
continue they can profoundly alter the profile and functions of the
welfare state. Two of the main trends, namely the effects of changes in
redistributive patterns and the role of the state merit Ipecialattention.
The welfare state is based on the idea that distribution of individual
income should not entirely be left to market forcel. Through taxation,
lubsidies and transfers in cash and kind, social wages go through a
process of redistribution. The extent and direction of redistributional
measures vary from country to country as do the principles for re·
diltribution and the groups benefiting from these transfen.
One of the pronounced aims of the welfare state is to alleviate the
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impact of poverty on the individual and the family; another is to pro-
vide an income for those who are excluded permanently or temporarily
from the labour market. While the more superior goal is to reach a
more equitable distribution of resources in the wider sense, i.e. social
wages, influence, status and power. Some of the welfare states have
gone quite far in securing social and economic rights for deprived and
marginal groups. But in all the countries surveyed, whether they are
well-developed welfare states or not, the tendency is that the re-
distributional patrerns are changing to the detriment of the most
disadvantaged and marginal groups. They are losing out both in relative
and absolute terms. The decision making is done inside the traditional
welfare sector as well as in other sectors and producing mainly
incremental and unconnected decisions. Three key decision-making
spheres can be distinguished: social policy. general fiscal policy and
industrial policy.
In the area of social policy-making it can be safely said that in both
developed and developing welfare states progress has come to a halt.
Few new programmes are being introduced, and established pro-
grammes are being assessed with an eye to greater efficiency and cost-
cutting. However, major programmes do not seem to be abandoned,
although incremental changes erode the principles upon which they are
built. The non-institutionalised sector is the easiest target, and pan-
doxical though it may be, this is also where the traditional clientele
of the welfare state is found. The major pan of social expenditure is
bound up in institutional care, wages and universal programmes. Politi-
cally they are difficult to touch. It is easier to cut expenditure for the
most marginal groups, such as the invisible poor. They are unlikely to
mount a threatening protest and have least public suppon. But
universal programmes are also under arrack, and this is where the most
fundamental changes can come about. Logically it can be argued that
social expenditure should be directed towards those groups who are
needy rather than diverting scarce resources to the population at large.
Much can be said in favour of selectivity as opposed to universalism -
whether the argument is bued on tlie justice of redistribution or simply
on cost saving - bu t the long-term effect of such a course is likely to
weaken the loyalty of citizens who do not profit from it. They will
turn to private solutions, while the less well off will again be left to
fight for their own interests.
One of the main channels of redistribution is of course general fIScal
~licy, but increasing inflation ntes are sapping the efficiency of this
policy instrument. Inflation always hits the poor and the low-income
earners the hardest because food and housing seize the main part of
their available means. Kenya is the extreme example here (Chapter 14),
but Britain can serve as an example just as well. Labour unions and
other employccs' interest groups fight to compen.te for deflating
wages. Organised defenders of wc:lfarc: rights have also been quite
successful in securing a certain inflationary compensation, while large
groups of wc:lfare beneficiaries are losing out. Some welfare pro-
grammes have been abolished or subsidies withdrawn, but more
programmes have deteriorated, not because of explicit political
deeisions, but because of lack of compensation for increasing inflation.
On the other hand, many wc:lfare states are witnessing an explicit policy
of individual tax cuts designed to boost the national economy. While:
taking nothing directly from the poor. this kind of (re)distribution puts
the disadvantaged in a relatively worse position because tax deductions
favour only those: participating in the labour market and especially
those with above average incomes (Townsend 1979).
On the scene of the labour market unemployment is. of coutse. the
crucial variable. It is partly independent of the national economy.
partly used to balance national accounts. The burden of unemployment
is mainly carried by unskilled and disabled workers. married women
and the aging. Retirement ages are lowered to keep down the labour
supply, but at the same time retirement and unemployment benefits
are cut in real terms as a result of rising inflation.
'Displacement strategies' have been successful both in West Germany
and Austria to make foreign workers return to their native countries
where employment opporrunities are even worse. In most wc:lfare states
rights to benefits are linked to occupational wc:lfare and those who are
denied entry into the labour market are also denied welfare rights. Thus
the welfare state creates new class divisions. The welfare state also
defines a new non-productive class, for example. through regulation of
retirement age and the number of compulsory years of schooling for
the young popUlation (Chapter 7). At the same time it more or less
ignores the informal economy of the unpaid labour market where
women are massively overrepresented and are the last to gain entrance
to the formal economy and the wc:lfare rights of the labour market
(Chapter 6).
The second trend which can alter the profile and functions of the
welfare state is the changing role of the government. Part of the
ideology of the welfare state is based on the idea of government respon-
sibility for social programmes. because government is seen - rightly or
wrongly - as a guarantor of justice, a defender of the weaker groups in
society, a controller of quality of service,-an indepe.n~en_tjudge in con-
flicts. and a renable source of fu"nding. Underneath lies the Usumption
that there is a n!ed for a dominant public sector to counteract the
impact of a dominant private market sector which is crucial in cteating
wealth as well as poverty. Conceptually it is assumed-that a distinction
can-be made betWeen a public and a private economy. and a public and
a private sphere of responsibility. although there are other. who argue
against this <e.g. van Gunneren and Rein 1984).
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There is little doubt. however. that much of the future argument
about the welfare state will be over the muddled issue of state inter-
vention. The call for ·prix~t!s-'ti.on· of public welfare services has been
made world wide. and again. it makes little differe~ce whether the
country has a weIl- or poorly-developed welfare state. or even the
extent to which the state presently intervenes. The solution offered is
still less state intervention, regardless of the problems being faced.
Even in Kenya where the public sector is smaIl. and smaller yet in the
welfare sector. the caIl is for privatisation. in spite of the widespread
pressure from the population for more extensive social services and
less disparity in access (Chapter 14).
Privatisation takes different forms. One is to let the private market
take over welfare provisions as a commercial proposition, the idea being
that a profit-oriented organisation is more efficient than a public
agency. Privatisation of hospitals can serve as an example here. Another
form is to subsidise voluntary agencies. through public grants, to take
over welfare services. This arrangement is the basis for the functioning
of the Australian and American welfare systems, whereas the
proportion of such agencies in the Scandinavian countries is negligible.
A third form is the introduction of fees for services which were
formerly free or subsidised. such as medical treatment or home help
services. A fourth means of privatisation is to decrease the capacity of
institutions and return dependent elderly persons, disabled people and
children to the family for care, and to encourage and financially
support self-help groups. Another form is reduction of national
economic responsibility and the return of nationwide programmes to
local communities. to be organised and financed locally.
There is nothing new about any of these methods. They are in vary-
ing degrees part of the welfare state. and always will be. Although it is
difficult to assess the impact of privatisation tendencies. there is linle
doubt that in all the countries surveyed trends are moving towards
privatisation. In his analysis Grunow (Chapter 13) shows how these
trends coincide with, and in some cues are reactions to. the shon-
comings of the welfare state in providing adequate services. The
development of these trends is also part of the process discussed earlier
in this chapter, where capitalistic market forces are able to exploit the
antagonism towards the welfare state. created through their own crisis
definition of the welfare state.
Those who stand to lose in this development are those who cannot
afford private hospitals, medical insurances and increased fees for
services; women who are brought back into the caring role without the
welfare righu of employment; former beneficiaries of welfare services
which have been privatised and who are not deemed eligible by
voluntary agencies; and local communities whose economy is faltering
under the new financial burdens imposed by central govcmment and
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who arc thereby prevented from providing high quality welfare services.
Here the vicious circle is evident. Those individuals and groups who
bear the social costs of privatisation arc further marginalised as a result
(Walker 1983), as are those who lose out due to changing redistri-
butional patterns. While there may not be a systemic crisis of the
welfare state, there is no doubt that as a result of the two major trends
analysed in this chapter, large numbers of individual crises have been
created and their number is increasing.
Comparing future.
The welfare states arc very different in strUcture and function, and
this will be decisive in their futures. The welfare states will continue to
develop within their cultural context because human needs, except for
the very basic needs, arc not absolute but created within a cultural
context. The processes identified above. whereby redistributional
patterns arc changing in disfavour of the more disadvantaged and
marginal groups, and state responsibility for welfare measures is with-
drawn, arc trends which loom over the future of all welfare states. The
core of the welfare state is the protection of deprived groups, and if
these trends arc camed further they will alter both the structure and
the functions of the welfare state. The poorly-developed welfare states
arc more exposed to these changes than the better-developed welfare
states, as argued earlier in this chapter. In an international context the
poorly-developed welfare states take the role of the disadvantaged and
marginal groups which are victimised by the worldwide restructuring of
production under rapid social change.
The well-developed welfare states seem fairly stable, but they have
problems of their own. Their stability is also a sign of rigidity which
makes them inert as policy instruments and slow to adapt to change.
Bureaucracies tend to develop an inner life where internal goal satis-
faction is given priority over external expectations. The welfare
bureaucracies arc no exception and much criticism is directed towards
the quality of service delivery. The welfare state has also beeome so
complex that large parts of it arc left outside political mechanisms of
control. Nevertheless, the concept of social wages has now come on
the agenda of the ordinary citizens and social n,htl are being extended
to include also an insight into the distribution of social wages. This
insight may in tum lead to a comparison of benefiu across groups
of beneficiaries and a re-cvaluation of traditional criteria of allo-
cation. So far the interest has been limited to discussions of selective
versus univcnal benefiu and has been confined within the arena of
social policy and the crisis definition. Once the concept of social
wages becomes fuUy linked to the labour market, the ongoing
discussion of work sharing and the failure of the market to provide
incomes for weU skilled and able-bodied citizens, then the call for a
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nlLtional guarlLnteed income bued on a wide unge of temporuy or
permlLnent lLbsence from the labour mlLrket can become salient items
on political agenda. Such lLn '!Ibsence income' mlLY reduce the threlLten-
ing complexity of the welfue state and lLbsorb some of the pressures
for a more equitable incomes policy to benefit those people whose in-
comes cannot be generated through the 11Lbour muket.
It now looks u if the industrilLliscd world is bcing a new economic
upswing. If this is the ClLse it is imporunt to uk whlLt implications this
could have for the fuNre of the welfare state lLnd the present crisis
definition. The ideology of the welflLre stlLtes wu more or less crelLted
during 1L time of increasing poverty lLnd economic insecurity, while the
implementation of welfare states came lLt 1L tUne of economic growth.
But few new idelLs which ClLn be chlLnnelled into new welfue state
developments have been generated during the present 'crisis'. It seems
u if the intellecNlLl and politiclLl energy hu concentrated on defending
the present welbre sute, rather thm lLccepting its debults and looking
into the future for 1L welbre sute which ClLn become an even better
instrument for social rights. There hu been no massive resistance to the
incremental chmges thlLt the welfue states ue going through. The
rising unemployment utes were expected to lelLd to unrest and lLttacks
on respective governments. U for example in Britain. Very few co-
ordinlLted lLttacks which could have led to systemic change. hlLve been
mounted. This is plLnly because the unemployed ue marginalised.
panly because funher unemployment wd threats about a national
crisis have kept the general public from finding a common cause with
the unemployed. It wu also expected that the social stability which the
welfare sute helped create would be eroded u the welfare state
marginaliscd deprived groups. So fu this has not happened. but here
the time span may be too shan for any effects to be apparent yet. The
question remains as to how far the marginalising process cm continue
wd how far influential groups can go in increasing their shue of the
social wages before the stabilising effect of the welfare state is under-
mined.
The poorly-developed welfare states are fighting to survive within
national economies which give low priority to welfare measurcs. There
is also little internal agreement on the desirability of developing welfare
measures. Thc economic crisis is a true crisis for the budding welfare
states where thc effect of a single incrcue in oil prices can be the size of
a national budget for medical cxpenditure. From the point of view of
the national economy it seems legitimate to give priority to the produc-
tive pan of the population. but the social unrest is sizeable and
demands for welfare rights as well as political rights are increasing
everywhere. The theory is that a well-developed welfare state con-
stitutes a stabilising environment for economic as well as cultural
conflicts. and that socilLl stability in tum incrcues productivity and
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foreign investments. Here the poorly-developed welfare states are
caught in a vicious circle where there is no economic surplus to feed
intO either the welfare sute or production; and poverty and the threat
of social unrest hampen further an economy which in many of the
developing countries would otherwise yield a surplus.
The relationship between the poorly-developed and thc well-
developed welfare states shows many resemblances to the relationship
between the poor and the rich in industrialised countries prior to the
development of their welfare systems. In relation to the developed
countries the developing countries are now struggling for a more favour-
able distribution of resources, more political influence in the world
community and more respect for their cultural backgrounds. Their
economy has been internationalised to such a degree that they have
become caught by market forces over which they have no control.
Rapid social change also impedes these countries more because their
poverty leaves them with few resources to counteract the impact of
changing technology and changing markets. Their story on the inter-
national level is much the same as that of the deprived groups on the
national level in industrialised countries prior to the existence of a
well-developed welfare state. The deprived of the pre-welfare state
countries fought for better incomes, protection from market ex-
ploiution, economic security, welfare rights and social rights and
this resulted in what is now labelled the welfare state. History repeats
itself when the developed countries are as unwilling to grant these
privileges to the developing countries as were the wealthy industrialists,
the bourgeoisie and the business community reluctant to relinquish
privileges in the early days of the welfare state.
It is an interesting area of analysis to consider how far it is possible
to draw parallels between these two developments separated by time
and culture. Of particular interest is whether the relationship between
the developing and developed welfare states, regardless of present
circumstances, is subjected to the same kind of dependencies and
forces which changed the relationship between the wealthy influentials
and the poor masses in the time of the pre-welfare SUtes. If so, it
will be intriguing to follow the strategies punued to improve inter-
national social rights and see if coalitions for self defence can be
directed towards this goal. Several international organisations and
agreements have been formed which can be turned into useful
instruments for this purpose. The formerly forceful weapon of strike
action, used in an international community with high rates of un-
employment, is not likely to be very successful but an economic
strike refusing to pay crippling foreign debts may be a new and power-
ful weapon.
The scenario of an international welfare sute may never be seen, and
certainly not in the near future. Some welfare rights are now slowly
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being extended across national boundaries. but only in symmetrical
exchanges, as for example within the European community. Otherwise
the well-developed welfare states arc extending foreign aid as charity to
meet the needs of overwhelming famine, and are keeping welfare rights
strictly within their own national boundaries. In the meantime. in
almost all other spheres of social life, the wotld is growing still more
international.
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